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 Gravity models provide ample evidence that a common language has a significant im-
pact on bilateral trade. In the typical tests, the flow of bilateral trade between two countries is 
the dependent variable, and the explanatory variables include the respective output levels of 
the two countries. These variables also usually include some indicators of barriers or aids to 
trade, including prominently geographical distance. When a dummy variable for language is 
added, and it is scored as one in case of a common language and zero otherwise, the variable 
is generally highly significant. (For bibliography and examples, see Frankel (1997); Frankel 
and Rose (2002) offer fresh results.) Yet even if a common language clearly helps foreign 
trade, numerous questions remain. The previous dummy variable itself raises a big point of 
interrogation. This variable is often scored as one for a pair of countries when a minority of 
the population in one of them can understand the people in the other (sometimes less than 5%, 
as in the instance of Niger-Burkina Faso or Pakistan-Tanzania). The implication then is that 
the actual number of people who can communicate directly does not matter: if only some 
other criteria are met, a small proportion of bilingual individuals can make the desired market 
information available to everyone. In other words, an adequate system of translation will do 
as well as direct communication in fostering foreign trade. But is this true?  
Other basic questions abound. Is the worlds dominant language, English, more effec-
tive than the rest in promoting trade? Does a common language boost trade between some 
countries at the expense of others or increase trade in general? Are the frequent references to 
the network externalities of a common language correct? Further still, how important is a 
common language inside a country? Does linguistic diversity at home reduce domestic trade? 
If so, is there compensation through foreign trade? Last but not least, does literacy promote 
trade? This whole host of questions about language and trade forms the subject of this inquiry.  
Our typical use of binary variables in economics as indicators of a common language 
largely reflects the difficulty of quantifying the numbers of speakers of different languages in 
a country. But some headway is possible. Perhaps the most extensive basis for progress today 
is Grimes (2000), now in its 14th edition since first appearing in 1951. This work is a massive 
effort to condense the information supplied by the entire profession of ethnologists about 
world languages. There have been at least three recent efforts to use this work to construct a 
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general quantitative index of language in economic research: Hall and Jones (1999), Wagner 
(2000) and Rauch and Trindade (2002). I shall do the same but with a somewhat different 
purpose: that of providing a general index of the ability to communicate directly in worldwide 
trade. This is not the usual aim. Hall and Jones focus on language because of a concern with 
certain institutional/legal features. Relatedly, they limit their attention to a few major lan-
guages. Though concerned with communication, Wagner deals strictly with the trade of Ca-
nadian provinces, and chooses his languages accordingly. For their part, Rauch and Trindade 
focus on ethnic ties. Consequently, they collect data strictly on common native languages, 
whereas, of course, bilingualism is of the essence in regard to communication. There has been 
one earlier effort to construct a general quantitative index of a common language in order to 
analyze world trade from a similar perspective as mine, by Boisso and Ferrantino (1997). But 
the authors proceed, in their pioneering work, like Rauch and Trindade, to attribute only a 
single language to each person. They also rely on a far more summary treatment than 
Grimes, by Katzner (1986).  
As an added interest, the latest edition of Grimes (2000) contains an index of linguistic 
diversity for all countries present in the study for the first time. The index concerns the prob-
ability that any two people in the country picked at random will have different mother 
tongues (Grimes (2000), p. x). The higher the index  the closer to one  the higher the prob-
ability that a random pair of individuals will have different mother tongues (see Lieberson 
(1981)). It would have served me better to have an index of the probability that any two peo-
ple at random in a country will not be able to communicate through a common language, 
since two people with different mother tongues may evidently both be fluent in a third lan-
guage. But the linguistic diversity index in Grimes may serve as a reflection of my preferred 
one. Mauro (1995) uses a similar index: namely, Taylor and Hudsons (1972) index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization (which derives entirely from a detailed Soviet linguistic study dat-
ing to 1964). Despite the sociological emphasis of the title, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
Taylor and Hudsons index pertains to the identical issue as Grimes: whether two randomly 
chosen individuals in a country will share the same maternal language. Since Mauro (1995), 
Alesina and Wacziag (1998), Easterly and Levine (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) have also 
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exploited the Taylor-Hudson index. On the other hand, these authors use the Taylor-Hudson 
index to treat issues of societal division and government behavior,1 whereas I shall use the 
Grimes index strictly in connection with communication. In regard to the 108 countries that 
both Grimes and Taylor-Hudson score for linguistic diversity, the correlation coefficient be-
tween the two indices is high: .85.  
The basic results can be summarized as follows. First, a common language promotes 
international trade both directly and via translation, that is, both as a result of the sheer num-
bers who can communicate person to person, and as a result of an established network of 
translation. One cannot say whether direct communication or a network of translation is more 
important. Second, a common language increases foreign trade in the aggregate. There is 
some substitution: that is, an increase in foreign trade between two sets of nationals who share 
a common language (directly or through translation) does come at the expense of trade with 
different foreigners; but the overall effect on foreign trade is positive. Third, a common lan-
guage exerts positive network externalities on foreign trade. But these externalities issue from 
within the trading countries themselves.  There is no evidence that the broad usage of a lan-
guage elsewhere affects bilateral trade between two countries. Thus, despite the dominant 
position of English as a world language, English is no more effective in promoting trade than 
other major European languages. Still, as a fourth basic conclusion, the major European lan-
guages as a group (including English) are more efficient than other languages in promoting 
trade. Fifth, a diversity of tongues at home does indeed boost foreign trade, and therefore, if 
only by implication, diminishes domestic trade. Sixth and last, literacy increases foreign trade. 
Indeed, literacy emerges as by far the most important linguistic influence in the study (with 
Student ts of around 20). For example, the impact of literacy on foreign trade is about three 
times higher than that of language diversity inside a country.  
The discussion will begin by developing the specific gravity equation that will serve in 
the empirical analysis (Section I). Next, I will explain my two indices of a common language: 
4
                                                 
1 This practice has aroused criticism from Collier (2001). Easterly and Levine (1997) provide 
some detailed discussion of the Taylor-Hudson index (derived from the Soviet study) and 
other closely related indices (which they have used and La Porta et al. have followed in do-
ing).  
 
the one relating to direct communication and the other concerning translation. Section III will 
present the elementary econometric results. Section IV will then extend the analysis in three 
directions: first, to cover the effects of different languages; second, to treat the distinction 
between the scale (trade-creation) and the substitution (trade-diversion) effects of a common 
language; and third, to examine the contribution of network externalities of language to bilat-
eral trade. The final section will contain some general discussion and suggestions for future 
research. All the raw linguistic series, including those I constructed, are in the data appendix.  
     I. The gravity model
The gravity model is particularly fitting because it focuses on the general barriers to 
trade, apart from the linguistic ones. Without controlling for other obstacles and aids to trade 
besides language  distance, political association, ex-colonial relationships, and the rest  it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw inferences about linguistic effects, as such.  
In using the gravity model, I shall consider output as exogenous. I shall also limit at-
tention to influences on total bilateral trade, without regard to differences between exports and 
imports. This opens the way for an important simplifying assumption: namely, that trade fric-
tions raise the price to the importer above the exporter's price by the same percentage, regard-
less whether the goods move one way or the other. On that supposition, if we accept the usual 
assumptions of gravity models that all countries specialize in the production of separate goods 
or separate varieties, and we assume that utility functions are identical, homothetic, and CES 
everywhere, balanced bilateral trade results. There is then nothing except aggregate trade to 
investigate. Under the preceding assumptions, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that a 
particularly simple form of the gravity equation follows. It is: 
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where Tij is the trade flow in either direction between countries i and j, Yi and Yj are the re-
spective incomes of the two countries, YW is world income, V is the elasticity of substitution 
between different goods, tij is  1+xij where xij stands for the percentage of the costs attributable 
to foreign trade frictions in relation to the export price p (regardless whether this price (fob) is 
pi or pj), and Pi and Pj are the respective Dixit-Stiglitz consumer-based price levels in the two 
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countries. In the case of Pj:  
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where the summation sign embraces all i prices inclusive of pj (in which case, exceptionally, 
pjtjj=pj) and Ei is the distribution parameter of the utility function (for good i or varieties com-
ing from country i). The corresponding equation holds for Pi. Evidently, V must be greater 
than one, as empirical work tells us is predominantly the case, if there is to be a negative ef-
fect of tij on trade.  
 Distribution costs can be easily incorporated in the preceding model, and this is impor-
tant since language plainly affects trade partly by modifying costs of distribution. As Baier 
and Bergstrand (2001) recently show (in line with Bergstrand (1985)), injecting distribution 
costs is no problem: it merely requires supposing that a CES relationship applies to the trans-
formation of goods into sales between different national markets. So long as the elasticity of 
transformation is the same whether goods move one way or the other, the gravity equation 
retains the same structural form as equation (1). The only differences are that the parenthetical 
expression (tij/PiPj) in this equation will comprise more terms and the entire expression will be 
raised to the power J/(J+V) rather than 1V, where J is the relevant elasticity of transforma-
tion into sales (see Baier and Bergstrand, sec. 2.3.4). From the standpoint of estimation, how-
ever, these differences are minor.2  
 One fundamental issue in estimating equation (1) is the proper treatment of the theo-
retical price indices, Pi and Pj. A simple way of handling the problem is to introduce a sepa-
rate fixed effect for each individual country. Several authors have recently chosen this route, 
and Feenstra (2004, ch. 5) provides a lucid explanation of the justification for the choice. Yet 
country fixed-effects do bear one important inconvenience with major consequences below. 
They interfere with the use of other explanatory variables that happen to be country-specific 
and constant over time, since those variables will be perfectly correlated with the country 
dummy. In the present instance, this problem would rule out two of the basic linguistic vari-
6
                                                 
2 Of course, Bergstrand himself has always favored a more complicated version with distinct 
export and import behavior in his considerable work on gravity models (including the paper 
with Baier).  
 
ables in the analysis, literacy and linguistic diversity. As a result, I will consider PiPj in two 
forms: one containing individual influences on PiPj but no country fixed effects, and the other 
with fewer or no individual influences on PiPj but country fixed effects. The aforementioned 
separate influences on PiPj that appear will take one of two forms. They will be either third-
country effects of influences on tij (and thus Tij), or reflections of the opposite pull of domestic 
trade on foreign trade (associated with the condition tjj < tij). The second sorts of influences, 
concerning the opposite pull of domestic trade, are generally country-specific and therefore 
incompatible with country fixed effects.  
Specifically, I shall construe the tij term in equation (1) to be: 
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where the u terms are continuous variables, and the v ones are 0-1 dummies. But, in the case 
of PiPj, I will use either: 
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In this case, the y terms are continuous variables while the z ones are dummies, and the Ck 
variables in equation (5) refer to the country fixed effects. Because of the presence of these 
fixed effects, some of the influences y and z in equation (4) drop out of equation (5) (r d r and 
s d s).       
Thus, the two estimated forms of the gravity model will be:  
 (6) log Tij = constant + D log (YiYj) + (1V) J1 log u1  + (1V) Jm log um
            + (1V) K1v1  + (1V) Knvn + (1V) O1 log w1 ...+ (1V) Oq log wq  
         + (V1) U1 log y1  + (V1) U1 log yr + (V1) Z1z1  + (V1) Zszs + eij
 and  
 (7) log Tij = constant + + D log (YiYj) + (1V) J1 log u1  + (1V) Jm log um
            + (1V) K1v1  + (1V) Knvn + (1V) O1 log w1 ...+ (1V) Oq log wq  
                       + (V1) U1 log y1  + (V1) Ur log yr + (V1) Z1z1  + (V1) Zszs  
         + (V1) GiCi + (V1) GjCj  + (V1) GcCc eij               r d r and s d s
The constants in equations (6) and (7) refer to YW. The coefficient D of the log (YiYj) term 
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in both equations (whose its presence in equation (7) depends on some temporal dimension) 
should evidently equal one. The country dummies Ci and Cj equal one while the rest of the Ck 
dummies in equation (7) (k z i, j) are zero. The r members of yk in equation (7) refer to the yk 
variables in equation (6) that are not defined by country but by country pair (r d r) while the s 
members of zk in equation (7) are the corresponding zk variables in equation (6) (s d s). The 
new wk terms refer to some possible influences on balanced-bilateral-trade that are consistent 
with the assumptions of the model but are not reflected in any other way. A fitting example of 
wk would be differences in climate. If large differences in climate between country pairs im-
ply better opportunities for trade between them than with other countries that have more simi-
lar climates, the variable should be added. It would not be reflected otherwise  in consumer 
tastes, general price levels, or trade frictions  but would be consistent with exogenous output 
and balanced bilateral trade. On the other hand, the exchange rate would be ineligible as a wk 
term, since this variable necessarily has opposite implications for two trading partners. The 
term eij is white noise associated with the dependent variable, bilateral trade.  
The bulk of the empirical work will concern equation (6). However, the test of equa-
tion (7) will serve as an essential check of robustness. In general, equation (7) has the impor-
tant merit of adding missing variables. But it has the obvious drawback of mixing up many 
influences by country and thereby hiding some separate effects on PiPj that may be of primary 
interest. 
The principal u, v, w, y and z terms in the estimates are as follows. I leave out the lan-
guage variables for later treatment.  
log u1 = log of (product of) relative distance.  
v1, . , vn = adjacency, currency union, political union, free trade area, ex-colonial relation-
ship, ex-common colonizer.  
log w1 = North-South difference.  
log y1, log y2, log y3 = log of (product of) remoteness, log of (product  of) population, log of 
(product of) land area.  
z1  = number of landlocked in pair.  
 As regards the sole u variable, u1, relative distance refers to the distance between two 
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countries (dij) divided by the square root of the product of their remoteness from the rest 
((RiRj)
0.5). The remoteness of a country (Ri) refers to the straight-line average distance of 
the country (i) from all of the others in the sample (including country j). This is not the ordi-
nary definition of remoteness. But I adopt it for want of a fitting synonym, even though the 
use of remoteness, in the usual sense, in testing gravity equations has come under serious 
criticism by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In usual parlance, the term refers to a 
weighted-average distance of a country in a trading pair to all third-countries where the 
weights rest on output. In light of those weights, the variable provides, or is supposed to pro-
vide, a broad measure of alternative trading opportunities, and thus may serve as a nearly gen-
eral surrogate for PiPj. It is this usual treatment of remoteness as a broad reflection of PiPj 
that has been the subject of Anderson and van Wincoops criticism. The same usage will not 
occur here. At present, remoteness will emphatically refer strictly to geography. There are 
no output weights; and remoteness is only one of a number of separate reflections of multi-
lateral trade resistance (PiPj) in the study. The decomposition of distance between relative 
distance and remoteness (log (dij )/((RiRj)
0.5) + log (RiRj)
0.5 = log dij) basically serves to permit 
a separate estimate of the effect of distance in shifting trade away from more distant foreign 
trade partners toward closer ones (an element of bilateral trade resistance) and between all 
foreigners and fellow countrymen (an element of multilateral trade resistance) (see Melitz 
(2004a, b)). This is my sole reason for the decomposition.  
 Besides adjacency, the v variables are the indices of political association that Frankel 
and Rose (2002) have successfully used before. The concern with ex-colonial relationships 
and an ex-common colonizer is particularly important here, since former colonial attachments 
have strong linguistic consequences, and if colonial variables were left out of the analysis, any 
significance of language could be the result of earlier colonial attachments. The dummy vari-
ables for the political associations also provide some reflection of protectionism, which is not 
otherwise taken into account. There exist detailed indices of trade protection, but these are 
available only for a much narrower sample of countries. The only w variable in the study is 
the North-South difference between trading partners, as measured by the absolute difference 
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in the latitudes between the two.3 This variable reflects the fact that a countrys latitude af-
fects the length of its days, its sunlight, its temperatures and seasons, and thus may alter not 
only its plant and animal life and the yield of its lands and waters, but also its required insula-
tion, energy and equipment, and its optimal production techniques. As I have argued before 
(Melitz (2004a, b)), the North-South difference may therefore foster trade based on compara-
tive advantage. 
 In regard to multilateral trade resistance, discussion of the first indicator, remoteness 
(as measured by log (RiRj)
0.5), has already preceded. Frankel and Romer (1999) provide a 
particularly cogent explanation for the next two, population and land area. As they observe, 
the two reflect the negative pull of domestic trade on foreign trade. The more people there are 
at home, the wider the opportunities to trade domestically, and therefore without bearing the 
costs of foreign trade. Land area, in turn, is an indicator of internal distance (which has some-
times been measured, perhaps more intuitively, as a line between two domestic locations, as 
in Wei (1996)). Other things equal, including the home population, a big country will have 
fewer foreigners to trade with at close range. This will tend to favor domestic trade. I consider 
landlocked as a z variable because it is defined by country and thus relates to the general 
choice between domestic and foreign trade, independently of trade partner. All of these last y 
and z terms drop out when country fixed effects are admitted. But I will subsequently add 
some y and z terms reflecting third-country effects, and these terms, relating to PiPj, will po-
tentially coexist with the country-fixed effects.  
The next section turns to the principal concern, language.  
        II. The language variables 
 The meaning of a common language between two countries ceases to be obvious once 
we admit translation. In principle, a small group of bilinguals could make all market informa-
tion available to each person in his or her preferred tongue in both countries. This could be 
                                                 
3 Let lat1 and lat2 stand for the respective latitudes of country 1 and country 2 in a trading 
pair (with Northern latitudes positive and Southern ones negative). Then the North-South dif-
ference is _lat1  lat2_. A related variable that now appears often in studies of economic 
growth is Distance from the Tropics, _lat1_ + _lat2_. But the variable proves insignificant in my 
tests regarding trade. 
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done on-line via an electronic system. Or alternatively, one could imagine wholesalers em-
ploying translators to provide all market information to everyone further down the distribution 
chain in their own language. In either case, the marginal cost of the translation services could 
be zero to the final users. This last condition is essential. To see why, consider the analogy 
with money. National currencies can also be converted through banks. But the purchaser of 
foreign currency pays the exchange cost in every transaction. If it were necessary to pay for 
the translation of every separate message in a foreign tongue, there would be no question of a 
common language.  But if new foreign-language messages can be gotten in ones home 
tongue for free, then the linguistic barrier may be non-existent or weak. As I have indicated 
before, the usual treatment of a common language as an all-or-nothing condition suggests that 
translation is a free good at the margin.  
Indeed, it is possible to turn the whole issue of a common language on its head, and to 
ask how there can possibly be any language barrier when translation can link up all world 
languages to one another. To this query, there are two answers, whose joint significance is 
clear, but whose relative significance is not. The first regards the costs of translation  both 
the social overhead costs of preparing the ground for the wide distribution of translation ser-
vices to large groups of people and the costs of dealing out such services to them individually. 
Even if true, in line with the previous paragraph, that once an appropriate foundation has been 
laid for widespread translation, the services can be meted out to people individually at a neg-
ligible cost, the social overhead costs can still be very important. Indeed, the usual treatment 
of a common language in foreign trade says that they are. According to this treatment, the 
problems of mounting and maintaining a language network are so large that, regardless of 
population size and number of languages, only two common languages exist between any pair 
of countries at most. The second answer to the query about the possible significance of lan-
guage barriers is the importance of direct communication. We have some clear indication of 
the importance of such communication from results of gravity models showing that immi-
grants promote trade with their country of origin (see Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), 
and Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999), Wagner, Head and Ries (2002), and Rauch and Trindade 
(2001)). One likely reason for this impact on trade is the immigrants ability to speak their 
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native language (as well as their capacity to translate this language into the primary one(s) in 
the host country). Accordingly, I will develop a separate measure of a common language per-
taining to each of these two arguments separately. One will relate to a communication net-
work and the other to direct communication. In doing so, I will use only one supplementary 
source besides Grimes (2000): the CIA country factbook  a frequent reference among econo-
mists. The decision to stick to Grimes and the CIA factbook, following a broader search, is 
mainly aimed to facilitate reproduction.   
The first measure, titled open-circuit communication, will require no set number of 
speakers for a common language, but simply demand that the language be either official or 
widely spoken in both countries (in any combination). By widely spoken, I will mean that 
20 percent or more of the population possesses the language.4 In accordance with previous 
work, I will also recognize only two open-circuit languages at most in any country. Seldom 
will this last limitation make any difference, and where it does, I will retain the two languages 
that have the widest international currency. This will essentially mean sticking to Arabic, 
English and French in some African examples where Swahili, Hausa or Fulfulde could have 
served instead. Open-circuit Communication has a value of one if the required condition is 
met (in any combination of the two alternatives for the two countries) and zero otherwise. It 
cannot be overemphasized that this measure is the result of an effort to make sense of the 
usual indices of a common language. Fifteen open-circuit languages result from the criterion; 
all are listed in Table 1. 
The second measure, direct communication, depends on the percentage of speakers 
in both countries. Fortunately, those percentages needed to be calculated only when they were 
large enough to make any statistical difference in explaining bilateral trade. I eventually re-
tained 4% as the minimum figure for a language to count for Direct Communication. This 
limited the number of relevant languages to 29 out of the total of over 5,000 in the 185 coun-
tries in the study (including some overseas departments and territories). Lowering the re-
12
                                                 
4 Anything in the 10% to 30% range would have made only modest difference, in light of the 
importance of official status. de Swaan (2000) provides some interesting discussion of the 
frequent assignment of official status to a minority language in multilingual societies.  
 
quired percentage to 3 would have increased the relevant number of languages by a dozen or 
so without affecting the estimates perceptibly. In constructing the figures, I treated different 
dialects, creole and pidgin versions of a language as equivalent. I also deliberately cumulated 
speakers of a language without regard to any second languages they may possess.5 Where 
numbers of speakers could not be inferred from Grimes in any other way, I used literacy as a 
guide, while paying attention to the alternative language(s) to which the literacy rates might 
refer. In those instances, the CIA country factbook served significantly, since I relied on this 
source for the literacy rates, and only used Grimes to fill in missing values. My reason for 
switching to the factbook for literacy rates lies in the much wider discrepancies in the dating 
of this particular variable in Grimes. Direct Communication obtains by summing up the prod-
ucts of the respective percentages of speakers over all the relevant languages (at least 4%) in 
the two trading countries. In principle, those values could have exceeded one because of bi-
lingualism. But very few such cases arose. In those cases, I set the numbers equal to one, 
which was equivalent to a general normalization.  
The underlying hypotheses about the signs of the influences of the language variables 
in the study are fairly obvious. Different languages are impediments to communication, there-
fore trade. In addition, there exists more uniformity of language within a country than be-
tween a country and the rest of the world. Thus, linguistic obstacles must interfere more with 
foreign than domestic trade. It follows that higher levels of Open-circuit and Direct Commu-
nication should both raise foreign trade. In addition, linguistic diversity at home should do the 
same since in its presence linguistic barriers even exist at home. Finally, linguistic obstacles 
must be more severe for people who cannot read and write, whereas alternative forms of 
communication  through speech and action  are easier at home. Therefore, those people 
should be especially handicapped in foreign trade. Thus, literacy should promote foreign rela-
tive to home trade. 
13
                                                 
5 Hutchinson (2002) tests the difference between English as a first language and as a second 
language (based on data in Crystal (1997)) using a gravity specification. He deals exclusively 
with bilateral trade with the United States. Paradoxically, English as a second language 
emerges, if anything, as more significant. However, judging from the results, the distinction 
between English as a first or a second language would not pass any statistical test of signifi-
cance.  
 
Table 1 lists all 29 languages figuring in the Direct Communication index and shows 
all 15 of those that also serve as open-circuit languages. In the case of Open-circuit Com-
muni-cation, the cited languages are strictly source languages. The destination languages 
 those in which the messages are received  constitute a considerable number, probably over 
a hundred; the number remains undetermined here. There are about 250 languages in the 
world with over a million speakers, and some small languages, like Maltese, receive strong 
government support. However, it is noteworthy that a few of the 15 open-circuit languages are 
small, whereas many big languages are missing from the 29 direct-communication ones. Big 
languages may be missing because of their strict importance in domestic trade. Japanese is an 
example. They could also be missing because of lack of trade data. Striking examples come 
from the ex-Soviet Union and include Russian.  
The appendix contains my scoring of the linguistic information underlying the con-
struction of the language variables. There, I also display the assignment of languages by coun-
try by Frankel and Rose (2002), whose database I use for the other variables besides language. 
(This assignment follows corrections for a few slips in the working paper version of their arti-
cle that happened to catch my attention in an earlier study (Melitz (2004a)), most of which 
Frankel and Rose have since repaired). Table 2 shows the correlation matrix relating to my 
two indices of a common language and their single one over the (approximately) 30,000 ob-
servations of bilateral trade in the statistical analysis. The correlation matrix also covers the 
indices of literacy and language diversity in the study. As can be seen, the correlation between 
Open-circuit Communication and Frankel and Roses (FR) Common Language variable is 
only .81  rather low if we consider that the two variables are basically meant to signify ex-
actly the same thing. This imperfect correlation stems entirely from my more frequent as-
signment of open-circuit languages to countries than theirs (with the single exception of 
Mauritania, which they list as French-speaking and I do not). In the first place, there are six 
open-circuit languages in my work that FR do not recognize at all: Danish, Greek, Turkish, 
Persian, Hindi and Malay. In addition, I assign the other nine open-circuit languages many 
more times than they do (for example, Spanish in Gibraltar, Dutch in the Dutch Antilles, Eng-
lish in St. Helena, French in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, etc.). As also noteworthy, the cor-
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relation coefficient between my two language indices, Open-circuit and Direct Communica-
tion, is high, 0.73, but not so high as to undermine the distinction  especially if we consider 
that both indices are equally zero in nearly three-quarters of the cases.  
 Table 2 further displays the lack of any correlation between my two indices of linguis-
tic ties and either literacy or linguistic diversity. However, these last two variables are signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with one another (.43). We would expect this to be so since a 
large number of major languages in a country will often be the sign of a low level of market 
integration (not always, if only because of immigration).  Consequently, the survival of many 
large languages tends to go together with poverty and illiteracy.  
III. The basic results 
 Virtually all of the data for the variables besides language in the study come from 
Frankel and Rose (2002) and are described in their data appendix. I owe a considerable debt 
to Rose for making this data public on his website. There are only two changes here in the 
relevant Rose database (apart from the aforementioned corrections concerning language). 
First, I measure geographical distance differently. Whereas he locates countries at their geo-
graphical center (in conformity with the CIA), I place them wherever their most populous city 
stands (as found in the CD-Rom encarta). Second, I consider all departments and territories of 
a country as automatically belonging to a free trade zone in the mother country. As a result, 
my dummies for a common country and free trade area are mutually exclusive.  
 The first column of Table 3 shows the result of the test of equation (4) in the usual 
form, with (the log of) bilateral trade (nominal imports plus exports in dollars deflated by the 
U.S. GDP chain price index and divided by two) as the dependent variable. As in Frankel and 
Rose, the test covers observations for six separate years at five-year intervals, starting with 
1970 and ending in 1995, and therefore includes controls for the individual years. Robust 
standard errors are shown (after correction for clustering of data for individual trading pairs). 
All of the earlier hypotheses are confirmed. The results are basically the same as those re-
ported in Melitz (2004a,b), which in turn do not differ from Frankel and Rose (2002) in re-
gard to the common variables in both studies (that is, all of them except the decomposition of 
distance between relative distance and remoteness, North-South, and the language variables). 
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The rest of the discussion focuses on language.   
 First and foremost, all four linguistic variables enter significantly with the right posi-
tive signs. Of the four, the outstanding influence is the diversity of languages at home. But all 
other three linguistic variables have Student ts above 3. The next two columns probe more 
deeply into the influences of Open-circuit and Direct Communication. These two influences 
partly overlap, and there could be some negative interaction between them. In order to check, 
I replaced them by their average  their sum divided by two  in column 2, and I termed this 
average Common Language (a variable of the same dimension as either one of them alone). 
The coefficient of Common Language shows up as essentially the sum of the two separate 
influences. On this evidence, the two influences bear distinct and additive impacts. Column 3 
injects the FR index of a common language into the equation, and thereby focuses on the rela-
tive merits of FRs linguistic variable as opposed to my two. The FR index is totally unimpor-
tant. Its presence does not even alter the estimates and Student ts of Open-circuit and Direct 
Communication. I experimented with the FR index in combination with either one of my two 
linguistic variables alone or their straight-line average. Either one of them totally dominates 
the FR index, with Student ts more than twice as high, and the use of the average, Common 
Language, completely removes any significance of the FR index. To all evidence, therefore, 
the distinction between Open-circuit and Direct Communication is an improvement, and facil-
ity of translation and direct intercourse represent two separate influences on foreign trade. 
The one unsatisfactory feature of the previous tests is the 1.4 output-elasticity of trade 
instead of one. However, this coefficient is impossible to interpret independently of the nega-
tive coefficient of population in the equation, since output and population are closely corre-
lated (compare Frankel (1997, pp. 57-61)). Yet, at least on my interpretation, theoretically the 
two influences are distinct. One of them concerns the feature of homothetic preferences, 
whereas the other reflects the opportunities to trade at home and free of any of the obstacles to 
foreign trade. In addition, joint output is not really independent of bilateral trade, and very 
significantly too, literacy interacts with per capita output (not surprisingly, in light of the in-
fluence of literacy on output: see, for example, Barro (1991)).  If we regress (the log of) joint 
output (YiYj) on (the log of) bilateral trade, (the log of) joint population, and joint literacy, 
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control for individual years, and correct the standard errors for clustering, we get the follow-
ing estimate:  
YiYj  = .19 bilateral trade + .84 product of populations + 2.76 product of literacy rates 
 (.01)            (.002)           (0.03) 
R2 = .98   n = 31249  number of clusters = 8202 
(robust standard errors in parentheses). Evidently, therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the 
respective impacts of output, population and literacy on bilateral trade in the previous equa-
tions.  
In response to this problem, the next two estimates of equation (4) impose a unitary 
elasticity of influence of joint output on trade.6 The variable on the left hand side is then the 
ratio of bilateral trade to the product of the two countries outputs. Column 4 replicates the 
estimate in column 1 following this change. The R-square jumps up from 65 to 89 percent (to 
which I ascribe little importance). The product of the two countries populations remains sig-
nificant while its negative coefficient drops. But this negative coefficient now can be more 
properly interpreted as reflecting the impact of opportunities to trade with fellow citizens in 
diminishing foreign trade. The influence of remoteness also rises and becomes roughly 
equivalent to that of relative distance, though the coefficient of relative distance is still esti-
mated far more precisely. (I have no explanation for this last alteration.) However, the most 
notable changes of all relate to the four linguistic variables. Those variables retain their signs 
and significance, but the impact of literacy shoots up. The most powerful linguistic influence 
on foreign trade in the study  by far  now emerges as the ability to read and write. Accord-
ing to the estimates, much more can be done to increase trade between two countries by pro-
moting an extra percentage point of literacy than an extra percentage point of a common lan-
guage. Of course, this impact of literacy could stem partly from production skills as well as 
the ability to communicate (especially since output is no longer separately present as an ex-
planatory variable). Still, either way literacy is essential.7
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6 Compare Harrigan (1994), Frankel and Rose (1998), and Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003).  
7 More troubling would be any associated impact of literacy on tastes and income elasticities 
of demand. I cannot explore the issue here, as doing so would require a more flexible version 
of the gravity model.   
 
The last column of Table 3 facilitates interpretation of the relative influence of the 
other linguistic variables in the study. Once again, I substitute Common Language for Open-
circuit and Direct Communication. Once more, this single variable has a coefficient that 
matches the sum of the coefficients of the previous two. But the impact of Common Language 
now emerges as, if anything, higher than that of linguistic diversity. Its statistical significance 
is higher too. Thus, common linguistic ground with foreigners seems to be at least as impor-
tant as linguistic diversity at home in fostering foreign trade. This is not necessarily surpris-
ing. A common tongue promotes trade with those particular foreigners with whom communi-
cation is especially easy, whereas linguistic diversity (a factor affecting PiPj) encourages trade 
with all foreigners indiscriminately. From this perspective, the surprising thing may be that 
Common Language does not dominate language diversity even more.  
IV. Further Tests 
(a) Different languages 
Such is the supremacy of English as a world language today that there is cause to in-
quire whether English is more effective in promoting trade than other languages. It is difficult 
to see how English could convey information better than other languages in person-to-person 
communication  that is, except through external effects, which I will consider separately. But 
in the case of open-circuit communication, the greater effectiveness of English could come 
from economies of scale in the diffusion of messages, independently of any externalities. The 
question thus arises whether English exerts a greater influence as a source language on trade 
than the other open-circuit languages do.  
I begin in Table 4 by repeating the estimate in column 4 of the previous table for con-
venience. The second column shows the result of the extreme assumption that English pro-
vides the only effective circuit of communication, or, in other words, that the other languages 
only affect trade through person-to-person communication. The general fit of the equation 
worsens somewhat and both the coefficient and the significance of Direct Communication 
rise. The third column is even more to the point: it shows what happens when we introduce 
Open-circuit Communication in English as a separate variable side by side with Open-circuit 
Communication in the other European languages (that is, after excluding Arabic, Chinese, 
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Hindi, Malay, Persian and Turkish from Open-circuit Communication). Open-circuit Com-
munication in English emerges as totally insignificant, and the other Open-circuit Communi-
cation variable remains highly so. There is thus no evidence of the special advantage of Eng-
lish as opposed to the other European tongues in open-circuit communication.8 I experimented 
next with English, Spanish, and French  or the three most important languages in the study  
as the only languages providing an effective circuit of communication. The results do not jus-
tify the conjecture. On the other hand, as already intimated, the idea that the European lan-
guages as a group are the only ones to serve as effective circuits of communication in trade 
does receive notable support. Column 4 shows the outcome of the relevant experiment. In 
comparing with the wider definition of Open-circuit Communication in column 1, the new 
one clearly performs better, and this improvement holds up in all my subsequent experiments. 
I will therefore only report further results with Open-circuit Communication in the European 
languages, and in summarizing, I will use a straight-line average of this Open-circuit variable 
and Direct Communication, termed Common Language*. Column 5 shows the result of re-
peating the estimate in the last column of table 1 with Common Language* instead of Com-
mon Language. 
(b) Substitution or scale effects 
Does a linguistic tie raise trade between two countries at the expense of trade with 
third countries or increase foreign trade in the aggregate? This next sort of question has arisen 
before in connection with some of the other variables in the analysis: namely, the political 
variables: free trade agreement, currency union, and so forth. The usual approach is to intro-
duce a dummy variable for cases where one or both countries in a trade belong to the relevant 
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8 Helliwell (1999) gets seemingly conflicting results. He finds English to be far more impor-
tant than German, French or Spanish in a related study treating a common language as a bi-
nary variable (explicitly based on status as an official language). But the conflict could come 
from the fact that he does not use Direct Communication (in which English plays a prominent 
role) as a control variable, whereas I do. In other words, as opposed to him, I test only for the 
separate significance of English as an Open-circuit Communication language. In addition, 
Helliwells sample covers a much narrower group of countries, only 33, 22 of them from the 
OECD. As he notes himself, in a similar study as his using more countries, 63 of them, 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1998) report no difference in the significance of English as opposed 
to Spanish, French or German. 
 
political association with some third country but not with one another. However, this method 
cannot serve here  at least, not without modification. There are too few instances of trade 
between country pairs where neither partner scores positively for Common Language* with 
any third country. As a result, any dummy of the previous sort, if used together with Common 
Language*, would cover too much of the field (in cases where one of the two indices is zero, 
the other will be nearly always positive, and inversely). It would then prove impossible to 
distinguish statistically between the influences of the two. But a certain adaptation is possible.  
Common Language* varies between values of 0 and 1 with disproportionately few ex-
amples of values between .1 and .5, since any pair of countries scoring 1 for Open-circuit 
Communication in a European language must register at least .5 for Common Language*, and 
except for country pairs with a common open-circuit language in a non-European language, 
all others can score at most 0.1 for Common Language* (since they must score less than 0.2 
for Direct Communication). It is then possible to construct an index of trade between country 
pairs that have a value below .1 for Common Language* where one but not the other member 
has a value of .1 or over for this variable in trade with some third country. This focuses atten-
tion on trade between countries that are generally isolated linguistically and countries that 
are predominantly not. As a result, there remains a very large proportion of observations in 
the sample where both this indicator and Common Language* will be zero. These observa-
tions regard pairs of countries that both have some significant linguistic ties with someone but 
not with one another. The point of putting those cases aside is simply to make possible a test 
relating to the other, smaller, and distinct set of cases. 
In instances where the previous specialized index of a linguistic barrier should be 
scored as positive, there is also a choice between scoring it 1 or the absolute difference be-
tween the two maximal values for Common Language* in trade with third parties.  I experi-
mented with both forms: the 0-1 and the continuous varieties. Both forms yield identical re-
sults in the foregoing equations in Table 4. But if substitution or complementary effects are at 
issue, there is reason to ask whether currency unions, political unions, free trade agreements, 
and ex-colonial-relationships too yield substitution or complementary effects. This further 
exploration can be done in the usual manner: by scoring a dummy variable as 1 when a coun-
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try member of a relevant political association trades with a country outside the association and 
0 otherwise. Once those other dummy variables are added, the proposed 0-1 index for lack of 
linguistic ties drops substantially in significance while the continuous index (with positive 
values heavily concentrated in the 0.4-1 range) is much less affected. Therefore, I retained the 
continuous index.  
The first column of Table 5 shows the outcome of the relevant experiment. The equa-
tion contains the relevant five new variables for trade with third parties, the one relating to a 
common language, and the four relating to the political associations. In the case of the politi-
cal relationships, the results conform to earlier studies, and will receive no further comment. 
But in the case of language, or our main concern, linguistic ties now appear to have a highly 
significant negative effect on trade with third parties. Quite reasonably, this substitution effect 
is smaller than the positive effect of Common Language* on trade between countries with 
linguistic ties, and the difference between the two coefficients is very significant statistically 
(according to an F test). Hence, there is still a net positive influence of linguistic ties on ag-
gregate foreign trade (which, according to the model, would be entirely at the expense of do-
mestic trade since output is exogenous). 
(c) Network externalities  
 What about the presence of network externalities of a common language? Advertis-
ers pay more to publicize at peak times and in well-frequented places. It is entirely plausible 
that speakers of a language would benefit from larger numbers of other speakers of the same 
tongue in the market. Perhaps the outstanding formal development of the idea comes from 
Church and King (1993) (who wrote with the issue of French and English in Canada in mind). 
A related development is in Lazear (1999), whose presentation has the added interest of cen-
tering the external benefits precisely on trade (though he does not focus on externalities him-
self). Random encounters take place between people. If they speak the same language, a trade 
occurs. Otherwise, it doesnt. The more individuals in a surrounding who speak the same lan-
guage, the higher the probability that random encounters will result in trades. It should be 
noted that both Church and King and Lazear consider the issue to be strictly direct communi-
cation, as is not the case here. Numerous passing references to network externalities of a 
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common language are also in print. (One outstanding, oft-cited case is Sabourin (1985).) In-
terestingly, Dowd and Greenaway (1993) close an article on the network externalities of 
money with a paragraph suggesting the application of their reasoning to language. Yet I know 
of no previous attempt to test the hypothesis of external benefits of a common language.  
 In trying to do so here, I will entertain two separate but complementary meanings (or 
manifestations) of external benefits of a common language. The first is intrinsic; the second is 
not but often intimated. Any network externality of a common language says that the impact 
of the language depends on the numbers of people who are connected (either directly or 
through a circuit) rather than merely the percentages. Thus, a given percentage of English 
speakers in a small community should have a smaller impact on the intensity of trade, or the 
ratio of trade to income, than the same percentage in a huge community if network external-
ities really matter. Beyond numbers, though, what must be relevant is the aggregate income of 
the people in a language circuit (or who are hooked up). Accordingly, my first measure of a 
source of external effects of a common language is the aggregate real income of the people 
with linguistic ties: that is, the product of the percentage value, Common Language*, and the 
sum of real incomes of the two trading countries combined (in logs). Since Common Lan-
guage* is a constant in the study, I shall use a constant for real income as well, namely, the 
value for 1990, or in the few cases where only earlier figures are available (at five-year inter-
vals), the latest one. 
 My second, and more conjectural, measure relates to the external effects of a common 
language stemming from third-countries. The hypothesis in this case is that worldwide usage 
is important. A simple interpretation would be that so far as people have a choice of language 
because they are bilingual (multilingual) or live in a country which receives messages in two 
open-circuit languages, they will tend to gravitate toward the one with the widest international 
currency  even if (as concerns Direct Communication) that language is not their preferred 
one and they do not master it well. Under this hypothesis, a language with widespread usage 
in the world may wield a larger impact on bilateral trade than another language that is better-
known within the two countries. Evidently, this last sort of external effect on bilateral trade 
cannot be captured by any aggregate of income within the two countries.  
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Accordingly, I constructed a separate measure of income for the previous sort of ex-
ternal effects. In this case, nine languages drop out (including one of the open-circuit lan-
guages, Swedish, which strictly functions between Sweden and Finland). This leaves twenty. 
For every bilateral pair, I constructed a different total of these twenty world aggregates of 
income. An example will suffice. Consider a trading pair with a Common Language* of .8, 
composed of .5 for English, .2 for Arabic and .1 for a third language that does not operate 
elsewhere (or, effectively, is neither official nor spoken by as many as 4% of the population 
anywhere else). The construction of the index then begins with the separate totals for the 
world income of people who can receive messages sent in English and in Arabic, based on a 
previous calculation founded on the data in the language appendix and 1980 real income.9 The 
third language is simply ignored. Next, the respective contributions of the trading pair to the 
preceding English and Arabic income aggregates are deducted. Finally, a coefficient of .5 is 
applied to the remainder for English, one of .2 to the remainder for Arabic, and the two totals 
are added up. The log of this sum of world income serves in the estimates. 
 The results confirm the hypothesis of external effects coming from inside the trading 
countries but deny any similar external effects coming from the rest of the world. The confir-
mation of the external effects from within is shown in the second column of Table 5. Both the 
index of external effects and Common Language* can be seen to be significant at the 5% con-
fidence level. The root mean square error also drops in this estimate. (Note that all 29 
source languages function in this case.) In addition, the coefficient of Common Language* 
is lower than before. But this is only to be expected, since the impact of this last variable now 
comes partly from a joint effect with income. The coefficient of Common Language* is also 
estimated with much less precision (even though Common Language* and this index are un-
correlated over the pertinent observations, which are those where both variables are positive 
rather than zero by construction).  
On the other hand, the index of external effects stemming from third countries is never 
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9 The earlier calculation goes as follows, given the example of English. For each country, in 
turn, take one or zero depending upon whether English is an Open-circuit Language, add the 
figure for English under Spoken Languages, divide by two, and multiply by the countrys 
1990 income. Then add up all the country totals. Do the same for Arabic, etc. 
 
significant except when used alone, that is, in the absence of either Common Language* or 
the other index of external influence. As shown in column 3 of Table 5, if this variable is 
merely added in the previous equation, Common Language* is the only one of the three that 
remains significant. The earlier index of external effects  the one that would concern external 
effects coming from within the two countries  also becomes unimportant. The significance of 
the index of external influence stemming from third countries when included alone has no 
particular importance, but must be attributed to the indexs positive correlation of .6 with 
Common Language* (over the relevant observations).10 There is independent reason to think 
so. If the external effects of language coming from third countries were significant, we might 
have expected English to show up as a separate influence on bilateral trade in the previous test 
without any control for external effects (table 4). Such was not the case. This reinforces the 
conclusion that the only externalities affecting trade are those coming from inside the borders 
of the trading parties themselves. 
(d) Country-specific fixed effects 
 Finally, consider the result of testing equation (7) rather than equation (6), or including 
fixed effects for all countries (185 fixed effects in all, 25 of which drop out because of in-
sufficient observations). In this case, all the earlier variables that depend on country i or coun-
try j alone are removed.  Those that drop out are remoteness, population, land area, land-
locked, language diversity and literacy (population being the only one of the six that varies at 
all over time). However, in principle, the performance of the other variables  those whose 
values depend on a countrys trade partner  should be unaffected. Accordingly, I retained 
these last variables in the next test: namely, relative distance, North-South, adjacency, Open-
circuit Communication, Direct Communication, the political variables, and the indicators of 
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10 It may be important to explain why this .6 correlation is consistent with the absence of any 
correlation between the other index of external effects  those coming from within the trading 
pairs  and Common Language*. The world income of English speakers is many times greater 
than the world income of speakers of any other language. English also contributes heavily to 
Common Language*. This combination of factors underlies the .6 correlation. On the other 
hand, there are many cases of tiny English-speaking countries trading with one another, while 
the index of the effects within the trading pairs depends strictly on the income of the trading 
parties themselves. This then explains the lack of any correlation of the earlier index of exter-
nal effects with Common Language*. 
 
substitution or complementarity. (But I also dropped the two indicators of the external effects 
of language, which depend on a unique country-specific value for income.) The results are 
shown in the last column of Table 5.  
Except for the indices of substitution or complementarity and two of the political vari-
ables (namely, free trade agreement and a common ex-colonizer), none of the relevant coeffi-
cients or standard errors is notably affected. The significance of a common language even 
goes up. Specifically, while the coefficient and significance of Open-circuit Communication 
in a European tongue drop (though the Student t remains above 3), the coefficient and signifi-
cance of Direct Communication double. (When used instead of Open-circuit and Direct Com-
munication, Common Language* has a coefficient of .91 and standard error of .07.) The only 
deterioration associated with language in this next test is that the impact of a common lan-
guage on third parties ceases to emerge. On the whole, the test is thus plainly corroborative. If 
we compare the results of the test  or the last column of Table 5  with the earlier estimates, 
we find only a moderate increase in R2 and decrease in RMSE associated with the country 
fixed effects. Hence, to all appearance, remoteness, population, land area, access to sea, lan-
guage diversity and literacy capture many of the relevant features of countries (therefore, PiPj) 
that are covered by the country fixed effects.  
   V. Discussion and conclusion 
We knew beforehand that a common language promotes trade. This study sheds light 
on the particular channels through which language exerts its influence, and introduces a num-
ber of influences of language that had gone unnoticed before, or at least had not been studied.  
Apart from direct communication, translation is important in surmounting linguistic obstacles. 
Though few people may speak Portuguese in a country, they may be tuned to the language 
all the same. Unless we allow for special facilities for obtaining information issuing from cho-
sen source languages, we miss a good deal of the ease of communication through language in 
foreign trade. Moreover, judging from the results, dictionaries, pictures, signs, numbers, and 
minimum vocabularies, etc., probably matter too in overcoming linguistic barriers. Why else 
would literacy make an important contribution?  If people can read and write in any language, 
they can cope better with the problems posed by foreign languages in general. As further evi-
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dence, the incentive to overcome language barriers is a factor. If people face linguistic obsta-
cles at home, they somehow manage to trade more with foreigners. In sum, possessing for-
eigner languages is only one of several ways of overcoming the linguistic hurdles in trade 
with foreigners. Thus, no single measure adequately covers the topic of language in foreign 
trade. But every one of the linguistic influences in the study speaks to the importance of re-
solving linguistic problems in foreign trade.  
The separate and distinct effects of Open-circuit and Direct Communication on trade 
may also reflect some specialization. The two channels of communication could operate 
largely in trade in different sorts of goods. Open-circuit Communication might be especially 
important in trade in homogeneous goods, where rudimentary communication may suffice, 
whereas Direct Communication may serve heavily in trade in heterogeneous goods, which 
may require more sophisticated intercourse. Rauch (1999) implicitly suggests a hypothesis of 
this sort. He argues that close personal relations between exporters and importers are not nec-
essarily significant in trade of perfectly homogeneous goods, whereas they are so in trade in 
heterogeneous goods. Because of issues of information, markets suffice in one case, while 
private networks are necessary in the other. The hypothesis of the separate roles of Open-
Circuit and Direct Communication in the two cases follows easily.11 12
A few other results of the study probe further into specific aspects of language. Eng-
lish seems to offer no particular advantage in foreign trade, while the European languages as a 
whole do. These emerge as better instruments of Open-channel Communication than other 
languages. In addition, linguistic links between countries seem to boost their bilateral trade 
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11 In the case of certain homogeneous goods, including crude oil and many primary products, 
the relevant information may even be so small and easy to get (in part, if not entirely, because 
of organized exchanges) that there are no language hurdles at all. Translation may then re-
solve the communication problem altogether at no notable cost.  
12 Interestingly, Rauch and Trindade (2001) apply the proposed hypothesis to the distinction 
between a common language and an ethnic network rather than two separate uses of language 
in communication. They reason that a common language should affect trade in all categories 
of goods the same way, whereas an ethnic network should promote trade in differentiated 
goods more than in homogeneous ones. In their study, the ethnic network is the Chinese dias-
pora across the world. They also treat a common language as a common mother tongue 
(measured as a continuous variable), which they consider  questionably, I think  as essen-
tially reflecting common tastes. Even a common native language in a worldwide sample may 
mostly reflect the ability to communicate. I will return to the issue in the text.   
 
partly at the expense of trade with third countries, but not entirely. Finally, there is some evi-
dence that network externalities of language contribute to trade between countries. But so far 
as this is true, the external benefits depend on the aggregate income of the particular trading 
pairs. On the whole, network externalities are not as central in trade as they are sometimes 
imagined to be, and the reason may have to do with the earlier point that a lot of market in-
formation gets transmitted in the absence of a common language.13
In closing, one important limitation of the work deserves emphasis. Language has 
been interpreted here strictly as a tool of communication, even though it obviously reflects 
many aspects of culture as well. The reason for this narrow interpretation is that, in the con-
text of worldwide trade, the only features of the language variables that apply generally regard 
communication. Other associated features are not always present, as it would be easy to 
document. Furthermore, in the case of Direct Communication, I have taken steps to assure the 
primacy of communication by including second-language and non-native speakers. (In the 
case of Open-circuit Communication, assuring this primacy was never even an issue.) But this 
is not to deny that additional variables reflecting culture or ethnicity would be helpful. Based 
on previous work, one cultural variable that easily comes to mind is the stock of immigrants. 
As the analysis now stands, immigrants are implicit here since they affect the index of linguis-
tic diversity. But this index also reflects long-standing, sometimes ancestral, linguistic divi-
sions inside national boundaries. The interest of a separate consideration of immigrants would 
lie in setting apart the element of ethnic ties to other communities abroad (which affects 
tastes, skills, trust and information) from strict issues of communication.  A separate treatment 
of immigrants in the analysis would generally aid in interpreting the linguistic variables as 
relating essentially to communication (compare Rauch and Trindade (2001) and the discus-
sion in note 12).  
Another useful extension would be to study trade in goods that are especially con-
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13 It may be worth noting as well that a common language is likely to be more important in 
production than in trade. To all indication, even varying shades in the ability to communicate 
directly matter a lot in the labor market. Empirical work uniformly shows a considerable im-
pact of linguistic skill on wages: see McManus, Gould and Welch (1983), Chiswick and 
Miller (1995), and the references in a broad survey by Grin (1996).  
 
nected to language, such as movies, television programs, books, and vocal music. In these 
cases, the world dominance of English and the production by the U.S. in particular, is notori-
ous. Cultural products in English sell extremely well in many places where English is other-
wise secondary in foreign as well as domestic trade. Broadly, how come English plays no 
special role in facilitating foreign trade but dominates the market for language-related prod-
ucts?14 Evidently, the question cannot be studied within the confines of the current version of 
the gravity model, which applies strictly to two-way trade, but would require a more intricate 
version of the model that distinguishes between exports and imports (and is largely associated 
with Bergstrand (1985)).15   
Finally, my treatment of the language variables as fixed effects can be questioned. Lit-
eracy rates have risen substantially in the last fifty years. Migrations accelerated in the nine-
ties in many parts of the world. Spanish is now significant in the U.S., Russian in Israel, etc. I 
have treated the data furnished in Grimes (2000) as roughly contemporaneous. In doing so, I 
have followed the practice in economics of treating all indicators of a common language and 
linguistic diversity in foreign trade as slow-moving variables that can be regarded as con-
stants.16 Indeed, Grimes (2000) corroborates this practice by furnishing unique figures for 
linguistic variables, despite wide discrepancies in dating when dates even appear. Yet from 
the standpoint of trade analysis, there is little doubt that more coherent series for literacy, 
Open-circuit Communication and Direct Communication could be constructed from a broad 
variety of national sources. In the process, there could be an effort to show the evolutions of 
all three variables. Apart from an improved ability to test earlier hypotheses, one outcome 
would be the opportunity to tackle various historical questions, such as the relationship of 
linguistic changes to the increase in the number of countries in the post-World War II period, 
a topic that Alesina and Spolaore (1997) have effectively raised. 
28
                                                 
14 For some of the data, and a limited effort to answer the question, see Melitz (2000).  
15 Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999), Wagner, Head and 
Ries (2002) and Hutchinson (2002), all distinguish between the influence of immigrant links 
on imports and exports, and all also rely on specifications mainly related to Bergstrand. 
16 In fact, this generalization applies to studies of trade but not labor. Labor studies of the im-
pact of linguistic skills on wages do make prominent use of time series evidence (see the ref-
erences in note 13).  
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 TABLE 1 
LANGUAGES 
Open-Circuit Languages    Other Direct-Communication Languages 
Arabic      Albanian 
Chinese        Fang 
Danish      Fulfulde 
Dutch      Hausa 
English      Hungarian 
French      Italian 
German      Javanese 
Greek       Lingala 
Hindi      Nepali 
Malay       Pashto 
Persian (Farsi)    Quechua 
Portuguese     Swahili 
Spanish     Tamil 
Swedish     Urdu 
Turkish      
 
TABLE 2 
 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
    Open-circuit       Direct Communi-  Common Language      Literacy Language 
    Communication cation        Frankel-Rose   Diversity 
 
Open-circuit     1 
 
Direct     0.73         1 
 
Frankel-Rose     0.81       0.75    1 
 
Literacy   0.10        0.10  0.03   1  
 
Diversity    0.14      0.08  0.07         0.43  1 
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TABLE 3: THE BASIC RESULTS 
 
REGRESSAND: Log of bilateral trade  Bilateral trade y 
product of GDP 
Log    product   of  
relative distance 
1.25 
(.03) 
1.26 
(.03) 
1.25  
(.03) 
1.21     
(.04) 
1.21     
(.04) 
Log   product  of   
remoteness 
.31 
(.15) 
.29 
(.15) 
.31  
(.15) 
1.09  
(.15) 
1.09  
(.15) 
Log North-South  
Difference 
.26  
(.02) 
.26  
(.02) 
.26  
(.02) 
.25  
(.02) 
.25  
(.02) 
Log product of real 
GDP 
1.4   
(.02) 
1.4   
(.02) 
1.4      
(.02) 
  
Log  product  of 
Population 
.44 
(.02) 
.44 
(.02) 
.44 
(.02) 
.06 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
Log product of land 
area 
.18 
(.01) 
.18 
(.01) 
.18 
(.01) 
.17 
(.01) 
.17 
(.01) 
Adjacency (0,1) .72 
(.12) 
.72 
(.12) 
.72 
(.12) 
.73 
(.12) 
.73 
(.12) 
Number of landlocked 
in pair (0, 1, 2) 
.29 
(.04) 
.29 
(.04) 
.3 
(.04) 
.42 
(.04) 
.42 
(.04) 
Common language: 
Frankel-Rose (0,1) 
  .05      
(.1) 
  
Open-circuit  
communication (0,1) 
.28 
(.08) 
 .26 
(.09) 
.38 
(.08) 
 
Direct communication .46 
(.13) 
 .43    
(.14) 
.35    
(.13) 
 
Common language  .69 
(.07) 
  .73    
(.07) 
Product of linguistic 
diversity 
.93 
(.11) 
.91 
(.11) 
.93 
(.11) 
.57 
(.11) 
.58 
(.11) 
Product of literacy 
rate 
.37 
(.11) 
38  
(.11) 
.37    
(.11) 
1.81    
(.09) 
1.81    
(.09) 
Currency union (0,1) 1.38 
(.18) 
1.39 
(.18) 
1.37   
(.18) 
1.23 
(.19) 
1.23 
(.19) 
Political union (0,1) .71 
(.45) 
.74 
(.45) 
.73    
(.45) 
.76    
(.44) 
.75    
(.44) 
Free trade area (0,1) 1 
(.1) 
1.02 
(.1) 
1 
(.1) 
1.12 
(.09) 
1.12 
(.09) 
Ex-colonial  
relationship (0,1) 
1.97 
(.13) 
1.97 
(.13) 
1.97   
(.13) 
2.02   
(.12) 
2.02   
(.12) 
Ex-common-colonizer 
(0,1) 
.43 
(.09) 
.41 
(.08) 
.42    
(.09) 
.21    
(.09) 
.21    
(.08) 
R2 .65 .65 .65 .89 .89 
RMSE 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.98 1.98 
Number of Observations: 31,010. Year-specific fixed effects are not reported. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; corrections for clustering of country pairs. 
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TABLE 4: ENGLISH AND OTHER EUROPEAN LANGUAGES 
 
REGRESSAND: Bilateral trade y product of GDP 
Log  product of relative 
distance 
1.21    
(.04) 
1.23    
(.04) 
1.22     
(.04) 
1.21     
(.04) 
1.21    
(.04) 
Log product of           
remoteness 
1.09  
(.15) 
1.11  
(.15) 
1.15  
(.15) 
1.15  
(.15) 
1.15  
(.15) 
Log North-South       
Difference 
.25  
(.02) 
.26  
(.02) 
.25  
(.02) 
.25  
(.02) 
.25  
(.02) 
Log  product  of       
Population 
.06 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
.07 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
Log product of land area .17 
(.01) 
.16 
(.01) 
.17 
(.01) 
.17 
(.01) 
.17 
(.01) 
Adjacency (0,1) .73 
(.12) 
.77 
(.12) 
.75 
(.12) 
.74 
(.12) 
.74 
(.12) 
Number of landlocked in 
pair (0, 1, 2) 
.42 
(.04) 
.41 
(.04) 
.43 
(.04) 
.43 
(.04) 
.43 
(.04) 
Open-circuit communi-
cation: English (0,1) 
 .33 
(.09) 
.10    
(.10) 
    
Open-circuit communi-
cation: European (0,1) 
  .39 
(.09) 
.44    
(.08) 
 
Open-circuit  
communication (0,1) 
.37 
(.08) 
  
 
  
Direct communication .35    
(.13) 
.61    
(.1) 
.33    
(.12) 
.33    
(.12) 
 
Common Language*     .81  
(.08) 
Product of linguistic   
diversity 
.57 
(.11) 
.58 
(.11) 
.55 
(.11) 
.57 
(.11) 
.58 
(.11) 
Product of literacy rate 1.81    
(.09) 
1.75    
(.09) 
1.79    
(.09) 
1.79    
(.09) 
1.79    
(.09) 
Currency union (0,1) 1.23 
(.19) 
1.26 
(.19) 
1.21 
(.19) 
1.19 
(.19) 
1.19 
(.19) 
Political union (0,1) .76    
(.44) 
.76    
(.47) 
.77    
(.44) 
.75    
(.44) 
.73    
(.44) 
Free trade area (0,1) 1.12 
(.09) 
1.03 
(.09) 
1.09 
(.09) 
1.1 
(.09) 
1.1 
(.09) 
Ex-colonial  
relationship (0,1) 
2.02   
(.12) 
2.04   
(.13) 
2       
(.12) 
1.98  
(.12) 
1.98  
(.12) 
Ex-common-colonizer 
(0,1) 
.21    
(.09) 
.23    
(.09) 
.17    
(.09) 
.18    
(.09) 
.19    
(.08) 
R2 .89 .89 .89 .89 .89 
RMSE 1.9824 1.9829 1.9814 1.9815 1.9815 
 
Number of Observations: 31,010. Year-specific fixed effects are not reported. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; corrections for clustering of country pairs. 
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TABLE 5: FURTHER TESTS 
REGRESSAND: Bilateral trade y product of GDP 
Log  product of relative 
distance 
1.22     
(.04) 
1.22    
 (.04) 
1.22    
 (.04) 
1.37      
(.04) 
Log product of           
remoteness 
1.23   
(.15) 
1.21   
(.15) 
1.21  
 (.15) 
 
Log North-South       
Difference 
.24 
(.02) 
.24 
(.02) 
.24 
(.02) 
.19  
(.02) 
Log  product  of       
Population 
.03 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
 
Log product of land area .17 
(.01) 
.17 
(.01) 
.18 
(.01) 
 
Adjacency (0,1) .79 
(.12) 
.77 
(.12) 
.76 
(.12) 
.54 
(.13) 
Number of landlocked in 
pair (0, 1, 2) 
.38 
(.04) 
.38 
(.04) 
.38 
(.04) 
 
Open-circuit Communi-
cation: European (0,1) 
   .24 
(0.7) 
Direct Communication    .82 
(.11) 
Common Language* .67         
(.08) 
.37  
(.17) 
.41  
(.2) 
 
Network externality 
from within  
 .013  
(.006) 
.017         
(.012) 
 
Network externality 
from outside 
  .005    
(.014) 
 
Product of linguistic   
diversity 
.68 
(.12) 
.66 
(.12) 
.66 
(.12) 
 
Product of literacy rate 1.67        
(.1) 
1.66        
(.1) 
1.66        
(.1) 
 
Currency union (0,1) 1.39 
(.19) 
1.46 
(.19) 
1.47 
(.2) 
1.11 
(.22) 
Political union (0,1) 1.18       
(.45) 
1.22      
(.45) 
1.2          
(.45) 
.86 
(.41) 
Free trade area (0,1) 1.3 
(.1) 
1.34 
(.1) 
1.35 
(.1) 
.55 
(.14) 
Ex-colonial  
relationship (0,1) 
1.45      
(.13) 
1.42       
(.13) 
1.42       
(.13) 
1.53          
(.12) 
Ex-common-colonizer 
(0,1) 
.31         
(.09) 
.29         
(.09) 
.3           
(.09) 
.66 
(.09) 
Common language*/ 
outsider 
–.2        
(.05) 
–.19       
(.05) 
–.19       
(.05) 
–.02          
(.05) 
Currency union/        
outsider (0,1) 
.34          
(.04) 
.34         
(.04) 
.34         
(.04) 
.11 
(0.8) 
Political union/outsider 
(0,1) 
.31          
(.05) 
.31         
(.05) 
.31        
(.05) 
.16 
(.11) 
FTA/outsider (0,1) .4           
(.05)
.4          
(.05)
.4           
(.05) 
.15 
(.06)
 
36
Ex-colony/colonizer/   
outsider (0,1) 
.01         
(.04) 
.01      
(.04) 
.01      
(.04) 
.05 
      (.04) 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89    0.91 
RMSE 1.9581 1.9578 1.9578 1.72 
 
The last column adds country fixed effects. Number of Observations: 31,010. Year-
specific fixed effects are not reported. Nor are the country-specific fixed effects in the last 
column. Robust standard errors in parentheses; corrections for clustering of country pairs. 
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APPENDIX 
THE LANGUAGE DATA* 
 
COUNTRY LIT-
ERACY 
DIVER- 
SITY 
LANGUAGES 
(Frankel-Rose) 
OPEN-CIRCUIT 
LANGUAGES 
 
SPOKEN  
LANGUAGES 
Afghanistan .31 .7             - Persian Pashto .45 Persian  .4 
Albania .93 .26             -            - Albanian . 98 
Algeria .62 .31 Arabic Arabic, French Arabic .83 French .2 
American Samoa .97 .12 English English English . 97 
Angola .42 .76 Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese  .42 
Anguilla .95 0 English English English 1 
Antigua & Barbuda .89 0 English English English 1 
Argentina .96 .21 Spanish Spanish Spanish .92 Italian .04 
Aruba .97 0            - Dutch, Spanish Spanish .74  
Australia .99 .13 English English English  .99 
Austria .98 .14 German German German .98 
Bahamas .98 .01 English English English .98 
Bahrain .85 .53 Arabic Arabic Arabic .85 
Bangladesh .38 .31            -            -            - 
Barbados .97 .09 English English English .97 
Belgium .98 .65 Dutch, French Dutch, French Dutch .56 French .56 
Belize .70 .70 English English, Spanish English .93 Spanish .35 
Benin .37 .90 French French French .37 
Bermuda .98 0            - English English 1 
Bhutan .42 .82            -            - Nepali .08 
Bolivia .83 .68 Spanish Spanish Spanish .44 Quechua .36 
Brazil .83 .03 Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese .95 
Brit. Indian Ocean Terrs   .98 0            - English English 1 
British Virgin Islands .98 .24 English English English .98 
Brunei .88 .45            - Malay, English Malay .88 English .05 
Bulgaria .98 .22            - Turkish Turkish .09 
Burkina Faso .19 .76 French French French .19 
Burundi .35 0 French French French .35 
Cambodia .35 .31            -            -                     - 
Cameroon .63 .97 French, English French, English French .42 Fulfulde .30 
English .21 Fang .05 
Canada .97 .55 English, French English, French English .65 French .22 
Cayman Islands .98 .58            - English English .98 
Central African Republic .60 .96 French French French .6 
Chad .48 .95 French Arabic, French Arabic .5 French .48 
Chile .95 .60 Spanish Spanish Spanish .93 
China .81 .48 Chinese Chinese Chinese .84 
Colombia .91 .03 Spanish Spanish Spanish .84 
Comoros .57 .01 French, Arabic French, Arabic French .3 Arabic .3 
Congo Democratic Re-
public 
.77 .92 French French French .58 Swahili .17 
Lingala .12 
Congo Republic .75 .61 French French French .7 Lingala .12 
Cook Islands .93 .37 English English English .93 
Costa Rica .95 .04 Spanish Spanish Spanish .87 
Côte dIvoire .48 .91 French French French .48 
Cuba .96 0            - Spanish Spanish .91 
Cyprus .94 .37            - Greek, Turkish Greek .75 Turkish .20 
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COUNTRY LIT-
ERACY 
DIVER- 
SITY 
LANGUAGES 
(Frankel-Rose) 
OPEN-CIRCUIT 
LANGUAGES 
SPOKEN  
LANGUAGES 
Czech Republic .99 .06            -            -                     - 
Czechoslovakia .99 .11            -            - Hungarian .04 
Denmark .99 .05            - Danish, German Danish 1 
Djibouti .46 .58 French, Arabic French, Arabic French .46 Arabic .11 
Dominica .94 0 English English, French English 1 French .7 
Dominican Republic .82 .05 Spanish Spanish Spanish .87 
Ecuador .9 .26 Spanish Spanish Spanish .79 Quechua .12 
Egypt Arab Republic .51 .46 Arabic Arabic Arabic .97 
El Salvador .71 0 Spanish Spanish Spanish .92 
Ethiopia .35 .84            - English English .35 
Faeroe Islands .99 0            - Danish Danish 1 
Falkland Islands - 0            - English English 1 
Fiji .92 .60 English English English .92 
Finland .99 .14 Swedish Swedish Swedish .12 
France .99 .24 French French French .99 
French Guiana .83 .47            - French French .83 
French So. Antarc.Terrs  1 0 French French French 1 
Gabon .63 .53 French French  French .63 Fang .29 
Gambia .39 .73 English English English .39 Fulfulde .17 
Germany, West .99 .18 German German  German .99 
Germany, East .99 .18 German German German .99 
Ghana .64 .79 English English English .48 
Gibraltar .80 .50            - Spanish, English Spanish .88 English .13 
Greece .95 .14            - Greek Greek .99 
Greenland .93 .27            - Danish Danish .93 
Grenada .98 0 English English English .98 
Guadeloupe .90 0            - French French 1 
Guam .99 .64 English English English .99 
Guatemala .56 .60 Spanish Spanish Spanish .44 
Guinea .35 .75 French French French .35 Fulfulde .04 
Guinea-Bissau .54 .85 Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese .54 
Guyana .98 .07 English English English .98 
Haiti .45 0 French French French 1 
Honduras .73 .05 Spanish Spanish Spanish .92 
Hong Kong .92 .48 Chinese, English Chinese, English Chinese .95 
Hungary .99 .14            -            - Hungarian .98 
Iceland .99 0            -              -                     - 
India .52 .93 English Hindi, English Hindi .50 Tamil .07  
Urdu .05 
Indonesia .84 .83            -            - Javanese .42 Malay .06 
Iran .72 .76            - Persian Persian .36 
Iraq .58 .65 Arabic Arabic Arabic .58 
Ireland .98 .17 English English English .99 
Israel .95 .65            - English Arabic .12 
Italy .98 .59            -            - Italian .98 
Jamaica .85 .01 English English English 1 
Japan .99 .03            -            -            - 
Jordan .87 .48 Arabic Arabic Arabic .87 
Kenya .78 .90            - English, Arabic Swahili .78 English .40 
Kiribati .90 .03 English English English .90 
Korea Democratic Rep.  .99 0            -            -                     - 
Korea Republic .98 0            -            -                     - 
Kuwait .79 .54 Arabic Arabic Arabic 1 
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COUNTRY LIT- 
ERACY 
DIVER- 
SITY 
LANGUAGES 
(Frankel-Rose) 
OPEN-CIRCUIT 
LANGUAGES 
SPOKEN 
LANGUAGES 
Laos .57 .56            -            -                     - 
Lebanon .86 .14            - Arabic, French Arabic .93 French .65 
Liberia .38 .91 English English English .64 
Libya .76 .35            - Arabic Arabic .96 
Madagascar .80 .50 French French French .80 
Malawi .58 .70 English English English .58 
Malaysia .83 .75 Chinese Malay, Chinese Malay .50 Chinese .2 
Maldives .93 .01            -            -                     - 
Mali .31 .86 French French French .31 Fulfulde .11 
Malta .88 .02 English English English .88 
Martinique .93 0 French French French 1 
Mauritania .38 .19 French Arabic Arabic .38 Fulfulde .06 
Mauritius .83 .60 English French, English French .83 Urdu .06 
Mexico .90 .13 Spanish Spanish Spanish .88 
Mongolia .83 .30            -            -                     - 
Montserrat .97 0 English English English 1 
Morocco .44 .47 Arabic Arabic, French Arabic .65 
Mozambique .40 .92 Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese .27 
Myanmar .83 .64            -            -                     - 
Nauru .99 .57            - English English .65 
Nepal .27 .69            -            - Nepali .7 
Netherlands .99 .20 Dutch Dutch Dutch .99 
Netherlands Antilles .98 .12            - Dutch, Spanish Dutch .98 Spanish .84 
New Caledonia .91 .84            - French French .91 
New Zealand .99 .10 English English English .99 
Nicaragua .66 .08 Spanish Spanish Spanish .92 
Niger .14 .64 French French, Arabic Hausa .50 French .14  
Arabic .14 Fulfulde .08 
Nigeria .57 .88 English English Hausa .46 
Niue .95 0 English English English 1 
Norway .99 .08            -            -                     - 
Oman .80 .68 Arabic Arabic Arabic .90 
Pakistan .38 .83            - English Urdu .7 Pashto .08 
Panama .91 .23 Spanish Spanish Spanish .77 
Papua New Guinea .72 .99            - English English .72 
Paraguay .92 .33 Spanish Spanish Spanish .92 Portuguese .12 
Peru .89 .35 Spanish Spanish Spanish .8 Quechua .17 
Philippines .95 .85 English English English .52 
Poland .99 .12            -            -                     - 
Portugal .87 .02 Portuguese Portuguese Portuguese 1 
Qatar .79 .57 Arabic Arabic, Persian Arabic .79 Persian .23 
Reunion .79 .09 French French French 1 Tamil .18 
Romania .97 .20            -            - Hungarian .11 
Russia .98 .27            -            -                     - 
Rwanda .60 0 French, English French, English French .5 English .5 
Samoa .97 0 English English English .97 
Saudi Arabia .63 .56 Arabic Arabic Arabic .82 
Senegal .33 .77 French French French .3 Fulfulde .23 
Seychelles .58 .07            - French, English French .95 English .58 
Sierra Leone .31 .82 English English English .31 
Singapore .91 .74 Chinese, English Chinese, English Chinese .51 English .27 
Malay .16 
Solomon Islands .32 .97 English English English .32 
Somalia .24 .2 Arabic Arabic, English English .18 
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LIT- 
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DIVER- 
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LANGUAGES 
(Frankel-Rose) 
OPEN-CIRCUIT 
LANGUAGES 
SPOKEN 
LANGUAGES 
South Africa .82 .87 English English English .3 Hindi .05 
Spain .97 .44 Spanish Spanish Spanish .97 
Sri Lanka .90 .31            -            - Tamil .16 
St Helena .97 0            - English English 1 
St Kitts & Nevis .97 0 English English English 1 
St Lucia .54 .67 English English, French English 1 French .85 
St Vincent & Grenadines .96 0 English English English 1 
St Pierre & Miquelon .99 .07 French French French 1 
Sudan .46 .56 Arabic Arabic Arabic .51 
Suriname .93 .79 Dutch Dutch, Hindi Dutch .93 Hindi .38  
Javanese .15 
Sweden .99 .37 Swedish Swedish Swedish .99 
Switzerland .99 .53 German, French German, French German .72 French .33 
Italian .07 
Syria .71 .50 Arabic Arabic Arabic .8 
Taiwan .91 .49 Chinese Chinese Chinese .91 
Tanzania .68 .95 English English, Arabic Swahili .93 English .05 
Thailand .94 .75            -            - Malay .05 
Togo .52 .89 French French French .52 
Tonga .98 .01            - English English .98 
Trinidad & Tobago .98 .47 English English English .98 
Tunisia .67 .01 Arabic Arabic, French Arabic .98 
Turkey .82 .25            - Turkish Turkish .9 
Turks & Caicos Islands .98 0            - English English 1 
Tuvalu .96 .17 English English              - 
U.S.S.R. .98 .40            -            -              - 
Uganda .62 .93 English English English .62 
United Arab Emirates .79 .78 Arabic Arabic Arabic .89 
United Kingdom .99 .07 English English English .99 
United States  .97 .35 English English English .97 Spanish .09 
Uruguay .97 .09 Spanish Spanish Spanish 1 
Venezuela .91 .02 Spanish Spanish Spanish .93 
Vietnam .94 .20            -            -                     - 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) .92 .34 English English English 1 
Yemen .38 .56            - Arabic Arabic .95 
Yugoslavia .91 .32            -            - Albanian .16 
Zambia .78 .9 English English English .85 
Zimbabwe  .85 .56 English English English .62 
 
*Languages (Frankel-Rose) is from Roses database for Frankel and Rose (2002). Otherwise, all the data in this 
table is extracted from Grimes (2000) with ancillary use of the CIA Country Factbook (except in the one case of 
language diversity for Hong Kong, which is drawn from Taylor and Hudson (1972)).  Literacy is from the CIA 
Factbook (with a few blanks filled in from Grimes). Language diversity is from Grimes. A zero for language 
diversity may mean that no calculation was made on the assumption that the number would be small (source: 
private correspondence). The percentage figures for the spoken languages are almost exclusively derived from 
Grimes. But some inferences depend on the literacy rates, in which case the CIA Factbook enters as well. Offi-
cial languages come from Grimes (2000) (except for a few isolated entries drawn from the CIA Factbook). An 
Open-Circuit Language is either official or has at least 20% speakers, and the maximum number of Open-circuit 
Languages is two. A Spoken Language is spoken by at least 4%. Some major national languages are omitted 
because they are neither accepted as official nor spoken by as many as 4% of the population in any trading coun-
try outside of the home one. Other languages do not appear because of missing trade data. This is notoriously 
true in regard to the languages in the ex-Soviet Union, including Russian. Persian refers to Farsi. Fulfulde is also 
sometimes referred to as Fula or Fulani. 
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